Axioms, Vol. 12, Pages 186: Aggregative Game for Distributed Charging Strategy of PEVs in a Smart Charging Station

Axioms, Vol. 12, Pages 186: Aggregative Game for Distributed Charging Strategy of PEVs in a Smart Charging Station

Axioms doi: 10.3390/axioms12020186

Authors: Ti Kang Huaqing Li Lifeng Zheng

This paper proposes a charging strategy for plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) in a smart charging station (SCS) that considers load constraints and time anxieties. Due to the rapidly growing load demand of PEVs and the load capacity investments in infrastructure, PEV charging needs to be subject to overload limits, beyond which failures can occur. The time anxiety is presented to address some of the uncertainties that may arise while charging PEVs. Under an aggregative game framework, this paper constructs a price-driven charging model to minimize costs by choosing the optimal charging strategy. Meanwhile, since the driver information is an aggregated item in the PEV cost function, the drivers’ privacy can be protected. Then, a distributed reflected forward–backward (RFB) splitting method is developed to search for the generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) of the game. The convergence of the proposed algorithm and the effectiveness of the charging strategy are verified by the detailed simulation and results.