Electronics, Vol. 12, Pages 2410: Securely Computing Protocol of Set Intersection under the Malicious Model

Electronics, Vol. 12, Pages 2410: Securely Computing Protocol of Set Intersection under the Malicious Model

Electronics doi: 10.3390/electronics12112410

Authors: Xin Liu Weitong Chen Neal Xiong Dan Luo Gang Xu Xiubo Chen

Private set intersection (PSI) is a valuable technique with various practical applications, including secure matching of communication packets in the Internet of Things. However, most of the currently available two-party PSI protocols are based on the oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, which is computationally expensive and results in significant communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a new coding method to design a two-party PSI protocol under the semi-honest model. We analyze possible malicious attacks and then develop a PSI protocol under the malicious model using the Paillier cryptosystem, cut-and-choose, zero-knowledge proof, and other cryptographic tools. By adopting the real/ideal model paradigm, we prove the protocol’s security under the malicious model, which is more efficient compared to the existing related schemes.