10 months ago
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Following the disturbing revelations in The Guardian that a ‘toxic’ workplace culture exists within the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Nuclear Free Local Authorities Chair has written to the force’s Chief Constable ‘offering him the opportunity’ to issue a statement.
The Guardian published its allegations on 6 December, and this article included a comment from Chief Constable Chesterman who said that he has ‘made it clear that anyone holding misogynistic, racist, homophobic, or other unacceptable views, or who carries out behaviour that breaches our standards of professional conduct, has no place in the CNC.’
Given the gravity of the historic and recent disclosures about the conduct of certain officers, the NFLAs were surprised and disappointed that the CNC has issued no apparent formal statement to the media or on its website recognising or refuting the validity of any of these allegations, nor more importantly outlining what specific action the force is taking from the top down to tackling this culture and to ensure that ‘the conduct and language of officers remains professional, impartial, and irreproachable at all times, both and off duty’.
There is a litany of press articles, Freedom of Information Act responses and statements issued by the Independent Office of Police Conduct outlining instances of disciplinary action and dismissals, including at least one senior officer, as well as ongoing investigations of misconduct in the CNC, many relating to disgraceful interactions on social media. Some of these are highlighted in the NFLA’s letter.
The Civil Nuclear Constabulary currently provides an armed guard at Britain’s nuclear facilities and to nuclear fuel and waste in transit, both by train and ship. The NFLAs are particularly concerned that the Energy Security Act of 2023 will expand the CNC’s role to enable armed officers to be posted at other sites of critical infrastructure, in public places and at public events. If any armed CNC officers hold prejudices against elected members, reporters, and sections of the public, their actions, if influenced by those prejudices, ‘could represent in a charged situation a potential tragedy, as we witnessed with the death of Jean Charles de Menezes’.
The NFLAs have previously expressed its concern at the prospect of ‘extending the potential use of lethal force beyond nuclear security’ when responding to a government consultation on the matter: ‘Viewed in the context of the Police, Crime Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021 [which has since become law], which extends police powers regarding peaceful protests, the potential presence of armed CNC officers at any kind of legitimate protest would add another layer of intimidation, designed to deter citizens from exercising their democratic right to protest’.
The NFLAs are also concerned that the CNC does not appear to be ‘very accountable or challengeable with the Police Authority comprising members from a police background’’.
Ends//…For further information please contact the NFLA Secretary, Richard Outram, by email at richard.outram@manchester.gov.uk
Notes to Editors
Background to the CNC (from the force’s FOI responses)
The Civil Nuclear Constabulary is a specialist armed police service dedicated to the civil nuclear industry, with Operational Policing Units based at 10 civil nuclear sites in England and Scotland and over 1600 police officers and staff. The Constabulary headquarters is at Culham in Oxfordshire. The civil nuclear industry forms part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure and the role of the Constabulary contribute to the overall framework of national security.
The purpose of the Constabulary is to protect licensed civil nuclear sites and to safeguard nuclear material in transit. The Constabulary works in partnership with the appropriate Home Office Police Force or Police Scotland at each site. Policing services required at each site are agreed with nuclear operators in accordance with the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 and ratified by the UK regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). Armed policing services are required at most civil nuclear sites in the United Kingdom. The majority of officers in the Constabulary are Authorised Firearms Officers.
The Constabulary is recognised by the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS). Through the National Coordinated Policing Protocol, the Constabulary has established memorandums of understanding with the local police forces at all 10 Operational Policing Units. Mutual support and assistance enable the Constabulary to maintain focus on its core role.
The NFLA response to a previous government consultation on the future deployment of the CNC:
NFLA submits joint response with local groups raising concerns over a potential expansion and diversification of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary
The UK and Ireland Nuclear Free Local Authorities (NFLA) has submitted a joint response with the groups Blackwater Against New Nuclear Group (BANNG), Together Against Sizewell C (TASC), CADNO, People Against Wylfa B (PAWB), Stop Hinkley and Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates (NWAA) to a UK Government consultation which considers the expansion and diversification of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC).
The CNC is a police force that is responsible for policing at all civil nuclear sites in the UK. The consultation is seeking views on a proposed service expansion of the CNC and how it can be most effectively achieved. It also proposes to amend legislation on the remit and powers of the CNC, allowing it “to utilise its expertise in deterrence and armed response to support other critical infrastructure sites, as well as assist other police forces in an emergency”.
The NFLA, and the local groups who campaign around developments at a number of UK nuclear sites, are concerned that the government’s plans are taking policing in the opposite direction to the one required. In our collective view, the aim should be to reduce hazardous industries, increase the resilience of critical infrastructure and at the same time increase the democratic accountability of the police.
Our response argues that, whilst the security of the UK’s civil nuclear infrastructure is important, the key to moving forward is by decreasing the threats and risks of that infrastructure, rather than increasing the powers of a centralised and armed police force.
The groups advocate this could be done by:
- Scrapping plans to use the UK’s embarrassing plutonium stockpile as reactor fuel which is likely to involve transporting weapons useable plutonium on UK roads and railways.
- Immobilising the plutonium stockpile as a waste form and storing it in a passive safe form at Sellafield.
- Environment groups have generally supported the on-site, above ground storage of spent nuclear waste fuel at the sites where it is produced thus avoiding the need to transport spent nuclear waste fuel to Sellafield. However, since EDF’s Advanced Gas Reactors will be closing over the next nine years, these transports will be ending soon in any case, thus removing another hazard that requires a police response.
- The groups who support this submission are opposed to new nuclear reactors, whether large, small or advanced. At the very least the requirement for armed policing, proliferation resistance and resilience against terrorist attack should be major factors in deciding whether to proceed with future nuclear plans. Opposition to new reactors particularly includes the concern that radioactive waste will need to be managed above ground on site until well into the 22nd century, far beyond a time when security and surveillance can be achieved.
The submission concludes:
- The idea of “the CNC needing to adapt to increase flexibility, resilience and efficiency in the face of the changing landscape” sounds disturbingly like an armed police force over which there is very limited democratic control searching for a job. Our aim should rather be reducing those hazards which require such policing as much as possible given the extent of the nuclear waste we have already created.
- CNC powers and role should be limited to civil nuclear sites, as its title implies. Any expansion to other roles and duties would require a force trained and indistinguishable to the conventional police force and would represent an expansion of nuclear police at expense of the civil police force.
- What is required is an adequately funded and democratically controlled police force capable and resourced to undertake policing including that of other critical national infrastructure sites.
- If nuclear constables are moved to other jobs in order to manage “fluctuations in demand from UK nuclear sites” there may well be crises when the same personnel are required at nuclear sites and other critical infrastructure sites. If the local police force has not developed its own capacity and resilience and is not adequately funded this could lead to a disaster.
- A nuclear force must be specifically dedicated to nuclear sites and its size related to the scale of nuclear activities. Any resources surplus to need should be deployed to support conventional democratically accountable policing.
NFLA Steering Committee Chair Councillor David Blackburn said:
“NFLA has joined with these six other campaigning groups to raise its profound concerns that an expansion of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and an increase in its powers is moving it in the wrong direction. What is required rather is concerted efforts to reduce the risks of the UK’s nuclear legacy and to avoid developing new nuclear reactor sites. By making these nuclear sites safer there will become less of a need for an armed police force. The concerning wider push as well for new laws which could reduce peaceful protest also greatly concerns us. The proposals in this consultation move the CNC further into being an extensively armed police force, when we should instead be looking at ways to have a democratically controlled and accountable police force protecting the public in a measured way.”
The recent Guardian article
‘UK nuclear police and workers share WhatsApp jokes about paedophilia, racism and homophobia’ published on 6 December 2023.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/dec/06/uk-nuclear-police-workers-whatsapp-jokes
The Letter sent to the CNC Chief Constable
Chief Constable / Chief Executive Officer
Simon Chesterman OBE, QPM,
Civil Nuclear Constabulary
Wednesday 3 January 2024
Dear Chief Constable,
Happy New Year.
I am writing to you as Chair of the UK/Ireland Nuclear Free Local Authorities.
Whilst I recognise that the CNC is presently performing valuable work in maintaining the physical security of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials in transit from attack or theft by terrorists, criminals, and (potentially) external state actors, I was disturbed to read the recent allegations made in The Guardian newspaper on 6 December 2023.
These concerned the use of sexist, racist and homophobic language by officers of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary in at least two social media groups towards fellow officers and workers at Sellafield, at least one politician, and one media commentator.
Some members of the civilian workforce were also implicated in this offensive behaviour, with the newspaper implying that a toxic workplace culture exists at Sellafield.
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/dec/06/uk-nuclear-police-workers-whatsapp-jokes
Regrettably, these are but the latest revelations indicating that the CNC has ‘a problem’.
Following the conviction of a former officer Wayne Couzens for the harrowing murder of Sarah Everard, the Guardian published in July 2021 that Couzens was reported to Kent Police for indecent exposure to a woman in 2015, whilst he was serving with the CNC at Dungeness Nuclear Power Station and living in Deal. There appeared to be a ‘failure to communicate’ between the forces with the CNC stating that ‘nothing was reported to them suggesting any problem with his (Couzen’s) behaviour or conduct’.
In a response to a Freedom of Information request no 2022 012, dated 16 February 2022, the CNC correspondent stated that of the 96 recent recruits who passed the force’s vetting process, 21 had since been subject to disciplinary action – over one in five – that seems an incredibly high percentage. I can find no figures for the 2023 intake.
In October 2022, the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) publicly announced it had started a criminal investigation into the conduct of five serving CNC officers, one former CNC officer now serving in another force, and one former CNC officer, linked to social media messages; worryingly the IOPC conceded that ‘a significant number of those messages to be of a discriminatory, derogatory or pornographic nature’ shared in a WhatsApp group.
These individuals had been informed they were being investigated for potential offences under the Communications Act by sending grossly offensive messages, and under investigation for gross misconduct as police officers.
https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/news/officers-under-investigation-over-offensive-whatsapp-messages
In November 2022, the IOPC issued a further statement that nine CNC officers were now subject to two investigations of ‘allegedly engaging in conversations of a racist, misogynistic, ableist and offensive nature’ in potential breaches of conduct amounting to gross misconduct. It is to the credit of the CNC that the force asked the IOPC to investigate.
In June 2023, the IOPC reported that in December 2022, an independently chaired disciplinary panel found that six serving police officers from three forces, including one from the CNC, to have committed gross misconduct for participating inappropriately with social media groups. The officers had been investigated following evidence found after a forensic examination of the mobile phone owned by Wayne Couzens.
Furthermore, in a response to FOI request no 2023 174, dated 23 November 2023, it was indicated that twenty-seven officers, including one Superintendent, were subject to disciplinary action in the preceding five years, of which six were ‘dismissed without notice’ and twelve received a ‘final written warning’; clearly then these were no minor infractions.
As the UK remains a parliamentary democracy, policing in the UK is based upon the expectation that it will be conducted by consent, with officers acting in a lawful, professional, and impartial way, with any force’s actions being subject to accountability and challenge, where appropriate, by elected members, legitimate media outlets, and the public.
Aside from dealing with site stakeholder groups, peaceful activists protesting nuclear trains or plants, and site visitors, the CNC has historically had limited interaction with the wider society outside of the nuclear community, as most officers patrol secure facilities that are often geographically isolated and inaccessible.
However, the conduct of every CNC officer will be of paramount importance in the future as, under the provisions of the Energy Security Act of 2023, the role of the CNC will now be expanded. Now the force is empowered to:
- Provide armed guarding services to other facilities that provide ‘vital services’ or ‘to deliver other protective policing services in response to [any] emerging threat’ (by amending Section 55 of the 2004 Energy Act).
- Support territorial police forces at the request of their respective Chief Constables (again by amending Section 55 of the 2004 Energy Act). These could be requests for the CNC’s specialist support as an armed police service or for additional capacity in officer numbers for unarmed service.
- Exert cross-border territorial enforcement powers, as are available to the territorial forces of the UK and the British Transport Police.
Unlike other police services, the CNC is unique in being routinely armed.
Consequently, armed CNC officers may soon be seen engaged in guarding other critical infrastructure sites in the UK, and potentially policing civil demonstrations and protests. Many police officers and many members of the public are frankly concerned at the prospect of the UK moving to a service that is routinely armed. The bearing of arms by any officers retaining any prejudice towards elected members, reporters, and the public could represent in a charged situation a potential tragedy, as we witnessed with the death of Jean Charles de Menezes; nor does the CNC appear currently very accountable or challengeable with the Police Authority comprising mostly members from a police or nuclear industry background.
Given the gravity of the historic and recent disclosures, and your future remit, we are therefore surprised and disappointed that the CNC has issued no apparent statement to the media or on its website recognising or refuting the validity of any of these allegations, nor more importantly outlining what specific action the force is taking from the top down to ensure that:
1. the conduct and language of officers remains professional, impartial, and irreproachable at all times, both on and off-duty, including in exchanging messages and images through social media.
2. an appropriate workplace culture is promoted and maintained through training, appraisals, and supervision.
3. individual officers exhibiting ‘toxic culture or language’ are promptly and effectively disciplined, and whistleblowing actively encouraged.
Chief Constable, I am writing to you to offer you that opportunity.
The NFLAs would welcome any positive commentary you can offer on the actions you and your senior colleagues are, and will be, taking as this would provide some reassurance to our members and supporters as to what they might expect of the future conduct of CNC officers (and whether there might be further plans to improve public accountability) considering the force’s expanded remit.
I shall look forward to your reply and thank you for your consideration of this matter. Please direct any response in the first instance via email to our NFLA Secretary Richard Outram at richard.outram@manchester.gov.uk
Yours sincerely,
Councillor Lawrence O’Neill,
Chair, UK/Ireland NFLA Steering Committee
