Obscure group formed by Khamenei could nudge Iran toward the bomb

A little-known but influential body handpicked by Iran's Supreme Leader may provide the spur Ali Khamenei needs to ditch his avowed refusal of nuclear weapons and reach for the ultimate deterrent in the wake of punishing Israeli attacks.

Iran’s ongoing conflict with Israel has led to calls for weaponization of the country’s nuclear program, first from hardline commentators, then MPs, then top advisors.

Khamenei has so far resisted all such calls publicly. His rejection of weapons of mass killing on religious grounds is regularly cited by Iranian officials as proof that Iran’s nuclear activities are peaceful and cannot be otherwise.

Given Khamenei’s official stance, most comments by Iranian officials to date have been read as posturing. However, some recent publications by the group, the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations (SCFR), may suggest a meaningful shift in Iran’s defense doctrine.

Khamenei established the SCFR in 2006 as an advisory body to assist his office in the development of foreign policy and strategic planning. Due to the Islamic Republic’s opaque workings Khamenei’s decision-making is difficult to parse, but it is clear that informal bodies like the SCFR have become increasingly significant in this process.

Since Iran’s missile attack against Israel on October 1, the SCFR has released multiple publications regarding the nuclear issue. This includes two interviews discussing how Russia and China’s nuclear doctrines have become more aggressive in response to recent actions by the United States and its allies. Both highlight the importance of nuclear weapons in enhancing deterrence capability, drawing evident parallels with Iran’s position vis-à-vis Israel.

Another paper outlines the strategic rationale behind Iran’s missile attack against Israel. It highlights Iran’s willingness to do more to deter Israel, warning that future responses would be harsher. These publications follow more explicit calls by the SCFR for Iran to reconsider its nuclear doctrine in recent months.

"It is only natural for Iran---as a nation facing threats and unilaterally bearing all the costs of alleviating Western countries’ “nuclear concerns” without reaping any economic or security benefit---to pose fundamental questions about the pertinence and sagacity of its current nuclear and defense doctrine," an article on the SCFR website reads.

An official in Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations speaks at an event hosted by the group

Groundwork for a shift

Such statements may not bear the supreme leader’s seal, but precedent suggests that they can be the groundwork for an eventual shift in Khamenei’s position, indicating that his advisors’ recent comments may be more than mere posturing.

Over the past several years, the advisory body has established itself as a sounding board for changes in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.

SCFR publications frequently anticipate public decisions by the supreme leader and other state officials – indicating that Khamenei may first convey his intentions to the SCFR for deliberation.

One example of this is a 2020 publication signaling support for closer strategic cooperation with Russia, prior to Iran’s accession into the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, support for the invasion of Ukraine, and the recently completed bilateral security agreement.

Another example is Iran’s adoption of sanctions relief and resumed negotiations with Western states as key foreign policy objectives under the presidency of Masoud Pezeshkian.

Before his term, the Islamic Republic appeared less interested in these efforts, as Khamenei prioritized the development of a “resistance economy” to counter the pressure of international sanctions.

As early as 2023, the SCFR promoted pursuit of sanctions relief as part of the agenda for Iran’s foreign policy in 2024, moving away from the “resistance economy” approach. In the lead up to Iran’s 2024 election, the SCFR released additional statements engaging with the subject. Since taking office, Pezeshkian has pursued these objectives with Khamenei’s tacit support.

Altogether, recent SCFR publications mark a change in tone from the advisory body’s earlier insistence that Iran is a responsible actor on the issue of nuclear proliferation, in line with Khamenei’s rhetoric, to one of more nuclear risk-readiness.

This brings concerning implications, especially in the context of Iran’s efforts to increase its stockpile of enriched uranium earlier this year.

In recent years, Khamenei has used the SCFR to extend a lifeline to politically isolated figures, deepen ties with ascendent officials, and keep policymakers under his personal influence.

This is demonstrated by the recent appointment of former SCFR secretary Abbas Araghchi as Foreign Minister, and his replacement by Ali Baqeri Kani, a prominent member of Ebrahim Raisi’s presidential administration. Khamenei has also increasingly relied upon the SCFR as an instrument for personal diplomacy—particularly in maintaining ties with the leaders of Iran’s armed allies in the region.

As Iran and Israel draw ever closer to a full-scale war, the SCFR’s recent publications may suggest that the Islamic Republic will continue to weigh the option of amending its nuclear doctrine.

This course will also be influenced by the expected implementation of a security agreement with Russia, which may enhance Tehran’s confidence.

Should the Iranian nuclear program be openly weaponized, the Islamic Republic will be further emboldened in its efforts to destabilize the region, support Russia’s war in Ukraine, and challenge U.S. interests.

It would also bring a significant risk of further proliferation, particularly as the regime formalizes the Axis of Resistance through a codified alliance structure.